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The European Elections in France:                        
The paradox of a more European yet more 
eurosceptic campaign 
Vivien Pertusot and Yann-Sven Rittelmeyer 
our months ahead of the European elections, the political landscape in France does not look 
promising. Despite the innovations introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, European elections in 
France seem set to remain ‘second-order national elections’.1 Both small and protest parties are 
likely to do well, while the governing parties will probably suffer a ‘protest’ vote. The rise of the 
radical right party and eurosceptic Front National will play an especially important role in the 
campaign. Turnout will still be much lower than in national elections, and a better showing than the 
2009 record-low turnout is far from certain. The electoral campaign may also show similar patterns, 
with little coverage of the political debates. Yet, they might be more about ‘Europe’ than in the past. 
Because of local elections in late March the French electoral context is unfortunate, which could 
favour a Manichean debate ‘for or against’ the EU, without real debate about policies and issues. 
Despite the potential shift in the campaign towards European rather than national issues, the combined 
effects of the economic crisis and the unpopularity of political leaders could crystallise a protest vote 
for both national and European leaders, as well as for the EU as a whole. 
The worst possible electoral context? 
The European elections will take place at a time of difficult yet slowly improving economic 
conditions. In France, some positive elements are visible but the growth forecast remains low and 
unemployment high. Moreover, at the end of 2013, the crisis of confidence in the political leadership 
reached a record low for the Fifth Republic, with only 21% support for President Hollande.
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factors will reinforce the tendency to use this election as a protest, as well as the propensity to consider 
the European elections as meaningless and thus not worthy of turning out to vote. 
Coming only two months after the two-round local elections, France’s electoral calendar will also 
hamper the success of the European elections. Participation may thus be even lower than the 40.6% of 
2009 due to the ‘voter fatigue’ of having to vote three times in only two months. 
The local elections taking place on 23 and 30 March leave only a few weeks to gear up for the 
European elections. Larger political parties – those who hold most town halls – will devote significant 
resources to the local elections, potentially relegating the European elections even to ‘third-order’ 
elections, not only behind the national elections but also local ones. Bigger political parties may 
consequently run two distinct electoral campaigns: largely uncoordinated efforts between the two 
elections’ objectives; with different strategy and communication teams etc. The only parties likely to 
avoid this pitfall will be the small and protest parties. Because they have fewer staff, they cannot 
afford to disperse resources. Moreover, they know that their chances of taking whole cities are limited 
due to the single-winner majority voting system. They will likely bridge the two elections into a single 
strategy: the link could be their anti-European platform, which offers scope to put a local spin on 
many issues. Marine Le Pen has already started to play up the role of critic of the EU – and of 
Germany. Indeed, it was the high point of her first speech in 2014. 
Both the local and European elections could become mid-term tests for the government. The Socialist 
party (PS) will have two choices: either to adopt a deliberate European tropism or to run on the 
government platform and defend its reforms and policies. The former should be obvious in the 
European context, but elections tend to be pit-stops to gauge support for the majority party at the 
national level. This scenario may be further reinforced by the positions adopted by the right-wing 
Union pour la Majorité Présidentielle (UMP). In 2009, the PS, then in opposition, ran a strongly anti-
Sarkozy platform and diluted its European arguments, which turned out to be unsuccessful. It won as 
many seats as the Green party, who then managed to federate the French ecology movements to create 
Europe Ecologie; soon to become the party Europe Ecologie Les Verts (EELV). The UMP is likely to 
attack the PS-EELV government this time, projecting most public debates onto national rather than 
European grounds. The centrist parties (the Modem and the year-old Union des Démocrates et 
Indépendants) will form a coalition to maximise their chances in the European elections, but at this 
stage they do not seem to be in a position to steer any European momentum in their favour. The EELV 
has been suffering substantial internal blowbacks in the past few years and, despite its presence in 
government, appears weak. Moreover, a rallying figure that did much to mobilise voters for the EELV 
in 2009 will not run: Daniel Cohn-Bendit. This leaves more room to the Front National (FN) and the 
Front de Gauche, whose two leaders, Marine le Pen and Jean-Luc Mélenchon, respectively, are MEPs. 
They are both critical of the government and of the EU. The FN made some headway on the national 
stage with the election of its first ever députés at the National Assembly last year and they fare well in 
many polls. The Front de Gauche is less prominent on the national stage, but Jean-Luc Mélenchon has 
managed to give the impression of being the only voice that counts on the far left. He appeals to the 
disappointed supporters of the PS and those who are disenchanted with the other dwindling far-left 
parties.  
Given these observations, one of the core questions in France for the next European elections is 
whether there is any strong party – or even any party – left to defend a pro-European platform; one 
that does not disparage the work of the European Commission or question the nature and path of the 
European Union, not with a view to stimulating serious debate but to scoring easy points among 
French voters.  
A pre-referendum on the European Union? 
Crises in the EU have previously been used as opportunities to strengthen the process of European 
integration. This crisis is different, however, not just because of its unequalled severity, but also 
because most of the improvements have been made outside of the EU-28 framework. In parallel, the 
discourse of ‘disintegration’ has become more evident. For instance, the Conservative party in the UK 
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wants to repatriate powers; the Netherlands started a ‘subsidiarity review’, and the German chancellor 
has questioned whether some competences need to be taken back. The electoral context and the 
evolution of French opinion toward the EU may lead the electoral campaign to dwell on debates 
around the nature of and support for the EU rather than be driven by issues.  
Figure 1. Survey on the image of the EU 
 
 
French fears about globalisation and growing scepticism regarding the benefits of the EU have led to a 
refocusing at national level. The economic crisis and the growing but largely negative press the EU 
has experienced in France have even reinforced the negative perceptions about the Union. As shown 
in Figure 1, the negative image of the EU has steadily grown since the last European elections, whilst 
the positive one has seen the exact opposite trend. A recent poll revealed that 52% of respondents 
want ‘less Europe’ (only 17% want more) and 58% think that the EU has a rather negative impact on 
the situation in France.
3
 This is likely to have substantial consequences for the European elections. 
Voting patterns differ between European elections and other national elections.
4
 Some voters may 
switch to parties that defend a European approach on a cross-border issue, which is what the Green 
party did successfully with environmental policies in 2009. On the other hand, some may cast a protest 
vote against the EU altogether, therefore amplifying the strength of euro-critical and anti-European 
candidates. The risk during this election campaign is that France will be riven by debate over the 
virtue of more or less Europe in a very short time span, with each party developing superficial 
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arguments and with voters lacking information and knowledge about the EU. Seventy-one percent of 
respondents feel not very informed or not at all informed, as evidenced by the same recent poll.  
Mainstream political parties will be in the awkward position – if they want to shape the debate – of 
choosing between full support for European integration and a diatribe against the EU’s direction over 
the past few years. More subtle arguments will likely have little resonance in political debates or in the 
media. This would benefit the ‘hard eurosceptic’ parties. Both the FN and the Front de Gauche have a 
tendency to use populist arguments that they know will strike a chord among public opinion, such as 
the EU ‘infringement of national sovereignty’. Additionally, the FN is already scoring high in the 
polls. In early October, Le Pen’s party polled first for the European election, which is unprecedented 
at the national level.
5
 A careful look at the polling data gives reason to believe that this was not a one-
off headline: the FN ranks first among the 25-49 age group and its supporters are more urban than 
before. The now more polished image might help the party to achieve success during this election.  
The unexpected negative effects of a Europeanised electoral campaign 
A potential rebuttal to the gloomy outlook for the European elections could be the new rules 
introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. It grants additional powers to the European Parliament to elect the 
president of the European Commission and urges the European Council to name a candidate “taking 
into account the elections to the European Parliament” (Art. 17.7 of the Treaty on European Union).  
Some expect that it can foster additional interest, a better sense of ownership and a more cross-
European debate. This might be the case, but not necessarily with the expected outcome. In France, a 
more politicised debate over Europe could end up favouring far-left and far-right parties, because of 
public opinion’s growing concerns over what the EU is aiming at. A debate about the EU is long 
overdue, but the lessons of the past, notably the referenda over the Maastricht Treaty and the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe, should serve as cautionary tales. Debate about the EU is 
needed, but only doing so close to a vote carries some risk.  
In 2009, the opposition parties called to sanction both the national (Nicolas Sarkozy) and the European 
(José Manuel Barroso) leaders. This time, due to the role played by Germany since the beginning of 
the economic and financial crisis, Angela Merkel might well be associated with Barroso. This could 
constitute a unifying motto for a transnational eurosceptic movement. In November 2013, Marine Le 
Pen tried to give it impetus by formally announcing an alliance with her Dutch eurosceptic 
counterpart, Geert Wilders. They intend to unify eurosceptic parties in several countries in order to 
form a group in the next European Parliament. Even if it is unlikely to influence French voters, it also 
contributes to the perception of the party by underlining the scale of eurosceptic feeling. Finally, the 
biggest paradox in France, and in Europe more generally, could be that the electoral campaign would 
be the most ‘Europe focused’ in the history of European elections, but with very vocal and numerous 
critical discourses.  
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